Introduction and Key Findings
The report, released this week and published by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, examines China’s strategic dominance in Africa’s critical minerals sector. This sector encompasses nickel, graphite, manganese, cobalt, copper, lithium, and rare earth elements (REEs).
These minerals are essential for electric vehicles (EVs), renewable energy, semiconductors, AI, defence, and medical devices, with global demand surging amid the green energy transition. China controls over 50% of global production and 87% of processing/refining, including 70% of REEs, 93% of high-strength REE permanent magnets, and 95% of heavy processing.
Key findings of the report highlight China’s “vertically integrated mineral ecosystem,” built over decades, which has locked-in African nations at the raw export stage of the value chain despite their vast reserves (e.g., DRC’s cobalt paradox: world’s top producer yet mired in poverty and conflict).
Beijing’s strategy, is amplified by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), combines mining acquisitions, infrastructure financing ($24.9 billion in BRI-linked mining loans in H1 2025 alone), and market leverage to secure feedstock for its EV and battery dominance (e.g., BYD’s six African lithium mines through 2032). Recent acquisitions include Botswana’s Kloemacau copper (2023), Mali’s Goulamina lithium (2024), and Tanzania’s Ngualia REEs (2025).
Weaponisation of Supply-Chain Dominance
The report highlights China’s “weaponization” of its position: export restrictions, licensing for products with Chinese content, and bans on military-use items, spurring rivals (e.g., US, EU) to build China-free supply chains. Africa, with 30%+ of global reserves, remains undiversified, exporting raw ores while China refines 98% of sodium-ion and lithium-iron-phosphate batteries.
| Critical Mineral | Global Processing Share (%) | Africa’s Reserve Share (%) | Key African Producers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cobalt | 87 (China) | 70 | DRC (70% world output) |
| Lithium | 65 (China) | 60 | Zimbabwe, Namibia |
| Copper | 50 (China) | 10 | DRC, Zambia |
| REEs | 90 (China) | 50 | South Africa, Burundi |
| Graphite | 80 (China) | 40 | Madagascar |
| Manganese | 75 (China) | 55 | South Africa, Gabon |
Data source: IEA (as cited in report). Note: Shares approximate; REEs include 17 elements vital for magnets in EVs/wind turbines.
How China Achieved Dominance
China’s ascent began in the 1950s with REE processing investments, evolving into advanced products by the 1970s. Western firms in the 1990s inadvertently aided this by transferring technology for cheap labor access, only for China to restrict foreign refining post-mastery. The 1999 “Go Out” policy propelled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) abroad, subsidized by $200 billion annually, capturing markets via the BRI’s economic corridors.
From 40 overseas mines in 1999, Chinese ownership hit 1,250 by 2022. Between 2000-2021, Beijing lent $57 billion for “transition minerals” in the Global South ($24 billion to Africa), outpacing rivals and granting resource access/political sway. Preferential SOE treatment enables outbidding, but fosters regulatory laxity, e.g., Zambia’s 2025 Kafue River toxic spill by Sino Metals Leach Zambia (50,000-1.5 million tons of heavy metals like arsenic/mercury/lead), downplayed by authorities despite endangering millions.
Core Features of China’s Strategy
The report delineates four pillars:
- High Risk Tolerance: SOEs absorb losses for footholds in unstable zones (e.g., brownfield projects over costly greenfields), reducing competition but exposing workers to attacks in Central/Eastern/Southern Africa and the Sahel. This yields long-term access amid corruption, labor exploitation, and degradation.
- State Backing: Diplomatic negotiations, subsidies, and insurance empower SOEs; of 166 global Chinese mining projects, 66 are African (likely undercounted). This subsidization undercuts African profitability.
- Diversified Access: Beyond ownership, tools include offtake agreements (guaranteed supplies), farm-ins (exploration funding for rights), leasing (tech/equipment swaps), minority stakes, and acquisitions—positioning China as miner, financier, engineer, and buyer.
- Infrastructure Integration: China builds/finances 1/3 of major African projects, including 23 GW power (20% regional capacity) and 1/3 of ports. Mining-linked examples: Zambia’s 100 MW Chisamba solar (Power China) for First Quantum (Jiangxi Copper stake); DRC’s 240 MW Busanga hydro for Sicomines.
A detailed table illustrates China’s “mine-to-port” corridors in the DRC, embedding Beijing at every stage:
| Mining Cluster | Connecting Land Infrastructure | Connecting Sea Infrastructure | Chinese Role Highlights |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tenke Fungurume (Cobalt/Copper) | Benguela Railway (Tenke-Kolwezi-Dilolo-Lobito) | Lobito Port (Angola) | CMOC Group (80% stake); CRCC rehab; CCCC (32.4% rail ops); CITIC/Shandong (20-yr port concession) |
| Kamoa-Kakula (Copper) | Benguela Railway (Kolwezi-Dilolo-Lobito) | Lobito Port | Zijin Mining (40% JV); Same as above |
| Sicomines (Cobalt/Copper) | Kolwezi-Zambia-Tanzania (TAZARA rail) or Kolwezi-Zambia-South Africa (roads to Durban/Richards Bay) | Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) or Durban/Richards Bay (South Africa) | 68% Chinese consortium; CCECC/CRCC road/rail upgrades; Zhenhua port expansion |
| Manono-Kitolo (Lithium) | Manono-Lubumbashi-Tanzania (roads + TAZARA) | Dar es Salaam | CATL (24% stake); Zijin license; CCECC/CRCC rehab |
This network controls export timing/costs, e.g., TAZARA’s $1.4B upgrade by CCECC (30-yr concession).
Additional levers: Resource-backed finance (RBF) in Angola/DRC/Zimbabwe repays loans with minerals but risks opacity/mispricing (AfDB critique, 2024). Multisector integration (e.g., BYD’s shipping fleet) and pricing power (flooding/restricting markets, as in 2023 lithium volatility) amplify influence.
Case Studies: Zambia and DRC
- Zambia (Copper Heartland): 600+ Chinese firms invested $3.5B+; CNMC’s Chambishi (85% stake since 1998) yields 100,000 tons copper/year, refined in China. BRI-funded ZCCZ and TAZARA upgrades; $5B pledge for 3M tons annual target.
- DRC (Cobalt Powerhouse): 24/33 cobalt exporters Chinese; TFM (CMOC majority) is #3 globally. Sicomines RBF ($7B infrastructure for 10M tons copper/600K tons cobalt over 25 years) draws scrutiny for opacity. Kamoa-Kakula (Zijin/Ivanhoe JV); 95%+ cobalt refined in China.
Risks Highlighted
The report flags acute risks for Africa:
- Economic/Debt Traps: RBF undervalues resources, erodes sovereignty; $24B African loans heighten debt burdens.
- Environmental/Labor Abuses: 2025 spills (Zambia’s Kafue: heavy metals; DRC’s Lubumbashi: electrolytes) threaten health/food security. Chinese-linked illicit mining damages ecosystems; survey links actors to West African degradation.
- Geopolitical Leverage: China’s dominance stifles value addition; subsidies/pricing power crushes local industries. Emerging tech (sodium-ion batteries, cobalt-free lithium-iron-phosphate) could crash demand for African staples.
- Social Instability: Attacks on workers; corruption/regulatory evasion foster resentment, e.g., DRC calls for Sicomines transparency.
Communities have in some instances countered this dominance via monitoring and litigation with Zambia’s September 2025 High Court Kafue case as an example. However for the most part, communities are often left out of any control or uptick in value from these mining developments. In DRC hundreds of thousands have been left homeless due to ongoing military conflicts to take control of these assets .
This despite greater value which could be attained via downstream processing and industrialised manufacturing of components for industries such as the EV market and battery industries.
Opportunities for Africa
Despite challenges, the report identifies pathways for “more equitable outcomes”:
- Policy Shifts: 13 countries’ 2023+ export bans (Malawi’s 2025 raw REE ban); EV incentives (Ethiopia’s 500K vehicles by 2030; Zambia’s component manufacturing).
- Regional Initiatives: DRC-Zambia battery/EV SEZ (Afreximbank/UNECA, 2025); AfCFTA integration; African Mining Vision (2009)/Commodities Strategy (2019) for sustainable use.
- Best Practices: Mandate tech/skills transfer; invest in processing/infrastructure; enforce transparency/labor standards; curb illicit mining; leverage AU mineral-producers organization.
- Alternative Models: Japan’s $7B Nacala Corridor (TICAD: shared financing, oversight, certification) shows responsible chains possible.
China’s assumed outsourcing to regions such as Africa hasn’t materialised due to automation in China, removing possible downstream value. Africa’s startups (e.g., EV buses/tricycles) and duty exemptions, do signal industrialisation potential, but much more co-ordination of purpose and investment, as well as infrastructure development needs to happen within the African eco-system for tis to materialise.
Geopolitics of Transformation
The report highlights China’s strategy, rooted in subsidies to build manufacturing for key industries in China with BRI, and diversification, securing global dominance but perpetuating Africa’s raw-export dependency.
Major risks (exploitation, debt, market volatility) remain the key challenges, yet opportunities via bans, SEZs, and oversight could harness minerals for jobs/growth.
The “geopolitics of critical minerals” transcends US-China rivalry; it’s about African sovereignty. As Beijing advances cobalt-free batteries (98% market share), urgency mounts for coordinated, transparent partnerships. The report urges stronger mechanisms to align external actors with African interests as an important step for African leaders to take note of.
